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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial independence in Myanmar has a long and diverse history.1
There are indications that there may have even been elements of judicial
independence in pre-colonial Burma.2 Moreover, some Burmese legal
commentators believed that British Colonization of Burma left a legacy of
judicial independence.3 After Burma achieved its independence in 1947,4
British trained Burmese lawyers, who were exposed to British concepts of
judicial independence, had a hand in writing Burma’s 1947 Constitution,5
and included several judicial independence principles in this document—
including principles affecting the appointment and payment of judges.6
However, after overthrowing the democratically elected government, the
new Burmese military government undercut judicial independence by,
among other things, abolishing the country’s high courts.7 During this period
of military control, the ruling government exercised significant power over
the judiciary.8
In 2008, after decades of military rule, Myanmar established a new
civilian government by drafting and ratifying a new constitution.9 The
1. There is currently a debate whether to refer to the country in question as “Burma” or
“Myanmar”. Without making any political statements and simply in the interest of clarity and following
the naming convention of a large portion of sources used, this paper will generally refer to the country in
question as “Burma” for periods until 1988 and “Myanmar” for periods of 1989 and after. See Lowell
Dittmer, Burma v. Myanmar: What’s in a Name, 48 ASIAN SURVEY 6 885, 885 (Nov.-Dec. 2008) (noting
that the State Law and Order Protection Council (SLORC) changed the name of the country known as
“Burma” to “Myanmar” in 1989 and reviewing the various positions in regards to the appropriate name).
2. See Myint Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: No March Backwards Towards the Past,
ASIAN-PAC. L.& POL’Y J. 4–5 (2000) (noting evidence that outside of the three areas expressly restricted
to the king’s authority (personal injury, property and death), the standards expressed in the legal principles
and laws of the Dhammathats (similar to legal treatises), were the supreme law of the land).
3. Id. at 7 (quoting MAUNG MAUNG, LAW AND CUSTOM IN BURMA AND THE BURMESE FAMILY
23–24 (1963)) (noting that Dr. Maung Maung claimed that the British legacy consisted of “equality before
the law, fair play, uniformity of laws for all—private citizen and public official alike.”).
4. David I. Steinberg, Maung Htin Aung, & Michael Arthur Aung-Thwin, Myanmar: History –
The Emergence of Nationalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 7, 2016) https://www.britannica.
com/place/Myanmar/The-emergence-of-nationalism [https://perma.cc/P3WU-QSJX].
5. See Zan, supra note 2, at 11.
6. David I. Steinberg, Maung Htin Aung, & Michael Arthur Aung-Thwin, Myanmar: History –
World War II and After, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.britann
ica.com/place/Myanmar/The-emergence-of-nationalism [https://perma.cc/P3WU-QSJX] (noting that the
Chief Justice of the Union would be appointed by the President with the approval of both bodies of
Parliament); Zan, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that the salaries of judges of the Supreme and High Courts
could not be amended without the judges’ consent).
7. See Zan, supra note 2, at 17.
8. Id. at 21–22 (noting that non-independence of the judiciary in fact became formalized in the
1974 Constitution which unified the executive, legislative and judiciary branches, subjecting them all to
the control of the Party, and requiring all of them to support the Party’s objectives).
9. Michael Arthur Aung-Thwin, David I. Steinberg & Maung Htin Aung, Myanmar: History –
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civilian government began its term in 2011.10 In December of 2012, the
International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (the “Commission”
or the “IBAHRI Commission”) released a report in which it attempted to
provide an assessment and recommendations for the new government with
regards to the rule of law in Myanmar.11 One of the key challenges the
Commission identified was Myanmar’s lack of judicial independence.12 In
early 2016, over three years after the Commission’s initial report, a new
government under the National League for Democracy party took power in
Myanmar.13 This political transition provided a good opportunity to assess
the effectiveness of the 2012 recommendations and refine recommendations
for the way forward. As such, this paper examines the effectiveness of the
Commission’s 2012 recommendations for achieving judicial independence,
the potential causes for any lack of progress and the potential for culturally
nuanced recommendations to guide the way forward.
First, this paper examines the meaning of judicial independence and the
purposes it fulfills. Among the various facets of judicial independence, this
paper focuses on the judiciary’s independence from coordinate branches of
government in Myanmar as an analytical lens. The paper then discusses the
status of judicial independence in Myanmar at the time the Commission
conducted its report, The Rule of Law in Myanmar: Challenges and
Prospects14 (“the Report”), as well as the recommendations the Commission
provided with the Report. Although literature reflecting developments in
judicial independence within Myanmar from December of 2012 to March of
2016 is somewhat limited, this paper draws upon available sources to
identify developments in judicial independence during this timeframe. The
paper then evaluates the Commission’s recommendations in light of
Myanmar’s culture and background using a dialectic approach that aims
intentionally to avoid the pitfalls of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism.
Finally, this paper suggests several culturally relevant
recommendations for judicial independence in Myanmar. In conclusion, this
paper argues that significant structural reform in Myanmar is only possible
insofar as it engages with the country’s existing power and incentive
Myanmar since 1988, http://www.britannica.com/place/Myanmar/History [https://perma.cc/2TS7-NUG
N].
10. Id.
11. See generally INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE : THE RULE OF LAW IN MYANMAR:
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS (2012) [hereinafter REPORT OF IBAHRI].
12. Id. at 7 (“The judiciary is currently subject to inordinate influence by the executive and
military.”).
13. Aung-Thwin, Steinberg & Aung, supra note 9.
14. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11.
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citizens’

II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE BACKGROUND
The international community, through its endorsement of the treatise,
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (“Basic Principles”),
has identified judicial independence as instrumental in achieving conditions
“under which justice can be maintained,” and an important mechanism to
“encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without any
discrimination.”15 Among the human rights and fundamental freedoms the
treatise seeks to safeguard, it lists “principles of equality before the law, . . .
and of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”16 The application of these principles
to Myanmar is complicated by the fact that the country has not ratified or
acceded to several covenants forming the basis of certain fundamental
freedoms.17 However, even assuming that the human rights and fundamental
freedoms that the Basic Principles identify are universally desirable,18 the
question nonetheless remains whether the international legal community has
discovered a magic elixir for attaining them. The answer to this question rests
on three related questions: what do we mean by judicial independence?; to
what degree are universal methods available to achieve judicial
independence?; and to what degree must any pursuit of judicial
independence reflect the unique cultural environment of the target country?
As to the first question, the international community has yet to
recognize a universally accepted definition of judicial independence.19
15. General Assembly Resolution 40/32, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 7th
Cong. on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, G.A. Res. 40/32 and 40/146, U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 and A/RES/40/146 (1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles].
16. Basic Principles, supra note 15, at pmbl.
17. See generally Ratification Status for Myanmar, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=119
&Lang=EN [https://perma.cc/2S8D-7PFR] (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (showing that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has not been signed or ratified by Myanmar and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not been ratified by Myanmar).
18. See Human Rights Explained: Fact Sheet 5: The International Bill of Rights, AUSTRALIAN
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rights-explained-fact-sheet5the-international-bill-rights#fnB2 [https://perma.cc/J8CH-NECX] (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (citing
HENRY J. STEINER AND PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS (2nd ed. 2000) for the proposition that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become
customary international law).
19. See Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded
Assumptions 1, 3 (La Trobe Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008/11, 2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1283179 [https://perma.cc/S9XP-3M8M] (claiming that the idea that judicial
independence is a clear concept is a myth or at least an unfounded assumption). Compare DEMOCRACY
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However, the Basic Principles provide a useful framework for discussing
this topic since the Principles represent a standard endorsed by the global
community.20 While the Basic Principles do not provide an express
definition of judicial independence, they offer a functional definition
providing that “[t]he judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially,
on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions,
improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.”21 Impartiality and a lack of
external influence outside of the applicable facts of a case represent the very
heart of many authorities’ understanding of judicial independence and
provide a basic framework for defining the term. However, these guidelines
are still somewhat vague.22
To better understand the meaning of judicial independence, it is helpful
to understand the function of judicial independence, or at least what it is
intended to accomplish. Judicial independence is not an end in itself, but
rather an instrument for achieving important goals and outcomes.23 Some
scholars believe the purpose of judicial independence is to fulfill social needs
for the regulation of civil society both among citizens and between citizens
and the government.24 Under this view, when multiple parties with different
needs and desires live together in a society, a symbiotic ordering of those
desires requires “reasonably well-defined laws setting out mutual rights and
duties,” where a “mutually acceptable third-party adjudicator” can resolve
any disputes.25 This theory holds that a third party adjudicator—
uninfluenced by either of the parties involved—is essential for both parties
REPORTING INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
1 (Sept. 2013), http://democracy-reporting.org/newdri/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/dri-bp-41_en_
international_standards_for_the_independence_of_the_judiciary_2013-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX9KRRPP] (providing that a working definition of judicial independence as “an independent judiciary must
(a) be impartial; (b) approach cases in an unbiased manner; (c) display no prejudice; (d) be politically
independent; and (e) operate without fear”) with Chief Justice Lance Finch et al., Judicial Independence
(And What Everyone Should Know About It), COURTS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 2 (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.llbc.leg.bc.ca/public/pubdocs/bcdocs2012/518687/judicial%20independence%20final%20re
lease.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XQ5-T62P] (“Judicial independence means that judges are not subject to
pressure and influence, and are free to make impartial decisions based solely on fact and law.”).
20. See Basic Principles, supra note 15 (noting that the General Assembly endorsed the Basic
Principles in Resolution 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985).
21. Basic Principles, supra note 15, at ¶ 2.
22. See Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that the UN principles never explain what
“inappropriate or unwarranted interference” means, which essentially restates the fundamental question
of judicial independence).
23. Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 1, 3–
4 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001).
24. Id. at 9.
25. See id.
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to accept the adjudicator as a common judge.26 Judges’ independence
purportedly allows them to “resolve the issues fairly, according to their
understanding of the law, and not out of fear of recrimination or hope of
reward.”27
Other articulations of the goals of judicial independence hold that the
law “reflect[s] substantive commitments to a course of action” that in
democratic governments reflects at least to some degree the will of the
people.28 These legislative principles are in turn, for the most part, general in
nature and should apply in the same manner to similarly situated parties.29
Judicial independence prevents other political actors from undermining “the
substantive commitments embodied in law through partial applications.”30
In other words, when the populace attempts to express its will through the
democratic process, an independent judiciary is necessary to ensure the
popular will is carried out in a comprehensive manner and not subverted by
parties with inordinate influence.
The desire to insulate decision-making from factors external to the
collective will is similar to the rationale for judicial independence provided
by the Basic Principles. The Basic Principles base their pursuit of judicial
independence in part on the securement of “international co-operation in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms without any discrimination.”31 All of these explanations describe
communities—international, national or local—that designate certain
legislative statutes or principles as desirable for the attainment of certain
goals. The realization of those goals rests on adjudicators deciding all
disputes within that community in accordance with the content of the
determined rules or legislation, and not in response to influences of other
actors who may represent the communal will to an inferior degree. This
rationale obviously rests on the assumption that judges adjudicating solely
in accordance with legislation more effectively represent the common will
than other actors who would seek to influence the outcome of judicial action.
This assumption will prove important when examining the principle of
judicial independence among cultures with authoritarian regimes.
Understanding the purpose of judicial independence does not
necessarily tell us from whom judges should maintain independence. For
26. Id. at 9–10.
27. Id. at 10.
28. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 966 (2002).
29. Id. at 967.
30. Id.
31. Basic Principles, supra note 15, at pmbl.
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instance, the Basic Principles’ comprehensive goal of protecting judges’
decision-making from undue influence “direct or indirect, from any quarter
or for any reason,”32 does not offer guidance on the primary sources of
influence that the judiciary must guard against. Judges may be influenced by
a variety of people and institutions. For instance, independence to adjudicate
impartially may be threatened by influence or coercion from coordinate
branches of government.33 Alternatively, judicial independence could be
challenged by public or ethnic pressures and loyalties.34 Finally, judges may
struggle to maintain independence from superior judges within the judicial
system.35
While all these sources of influence may violate the fundamental
freedoms associated with adjudication, this paper focuses on freedom from
coordinate branches of the government, or intra-governmental judicial
independence. Intra-governmental independence forms arguably one of the
most central elements of judicial independence. As one scholar explains,
“the most widely recognized dimension of judicial independence . . .
embraces . . . the separation of powers principle.”36 By definition, for the
judiciary to be separate from other branches, it must be independent of them
to a certain degree. Second, intra-governmental independence is particularly
interesting for a cultural analysis because the tri-partite division of powers,
which underlies separation of the judiciary from control of other branches of
government has deep roots in Western societies ,37 and yet promises benefits
for countries in Southeast Asia—including Myanmar. Third, due to
Myanmar’s historically strong and influential executive, as described in
other sections of this paper, judicial independence from other branches of
government represents a significant departure from past practices.

32. Basic Principles, supra note 15, at ¶ 2.
33. See Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 3 (noting decisional independence from the government as
an element of “external independence” and the ability of the judiciary as a whole to function without
influence by other entities as a component of “collective independence”); see also UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 1 (Jan. 2009),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Judicial-Appointments-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6D2-CHRJ].
34. See Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 3 (noting decisional independence from members of society
as an element of external independence); UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 33, at 1.
35. See Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 3 (noting decision independence from “administrative
hierarchies within the court” and higher judges as an element of “internal independence”); UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 33, at 1.
36. Russell, supra note 23, at 11.
37. M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 23, 98 (2d. ed. 1998)
(noting that the modern views of the executive, legislative and judicial functions of government began to
develop in 17th century England in response to “particular problems in Western societies”); see also
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 28, at 967 (referencing Montesquieu as the origin of the traditional
concept and rationale for judicial independence).
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Although corruption appears to have been commonplace within
Myanmar’s judiciary in recent history,38 judicial independence from the
other governmental branches provides a fruitful opportunity for legal
analysis given the exceptionally strong executive powers created by
Myanmar’s Constitution.39
III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN MYANMAR
The IBAHRI Commission’s Report provided a thorough analysis of
many elements of the rule of law in Myanmar in 2012.40 The Commission
itself consisted of jurists with extensive judicial and academic experience,
including the first President of the International Criminal Court,41 and the
inaugural co-chair of the IBAHRI.42 The Commission conducted eight days
of field research in Myanmar in August of 2012, involving interactions with
“senior politicians, civil society activists, judges, lawyers, diplomats, and
representatives of a number of international NGOs.”43
The Report begins with a summary of Myanmar’s background and
history, focusing primarily on the country’s political and economic
development.44 The Commission then examined factors affecting rule of law
in various spheres of Myanmar society, including the Civil Sphere, the
Political Sphere, the Legislative Sphere, the Myanmar National Human
Rights Commission, the Military Sphere, the Judicial Sphere (I): Courts and
Judges, and the Judicial Sphere (II): the Legal Profession.45 While thematic
overlap exists between many sections on any given topic, several sections,
including “The Political Sphere: Branches of Government” the “Judicial
Sphere: Courts and Judges” and the “Judicial Sphere: the Legal Profession”
directly addressed issues pertinent to intra-governmental judicial
independence in the country.46 Within each of these sections, the
38. See NICK CHEESMAN, OPPOSING THE RULE OF LAW: HOW MYANMAR’S COURTS MAKE LAW
AND ORDER 182–86 (2015) (discussing the thriving business of bribery that surrounded court proceedings

in Myanmar).
39. See infra Section III.a (noting the significant influence that the executive has over the
appointment and financing of the judiciary).
40. See generally REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11.
41. Philippe Kirsch OC, QC, a Canadian lawyer and diplomat who was the first president of the
International Criminal Court. Id. at 9.
42. Professor Nicholas Cowdery AM, QC, the inaugural Co-Chair of the IBAHRI and a former
Director of Public Prosecutions of New South Wales. Id. at 10.
43. Id. at 6, 12.
44. Id. at 16–24.
45. Id. at Table of Contents.
46. While the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC) seeks to vindicate
fundamental rights, just as courts do, the author does not consider the dynamics between the MNHRC
and the courts that affect judicial independence to be pronounced enough to warrant separate analysis in
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Commission’s analysis of judicial independence examined (a) structural
elements affecting the judiciary—for example, how effectively the
constitutionally-prescribed system of government separates political powers
among various political institutions—and (b) the population’s perception of
the level of judicial independence in its country.
A. Structural Factors of Judicial Independence in Myanmar at the Time of
the 2012 Report
The Report describes the civilian court structure in Myanmar, with the
Supreme Court at the apex of its four levels of civilian courts.47 The Supreme
Court oversees the state and regional High Court, the District and SelfAdministered Area Courts, and the township courts.48 The Report also notes
the quasi-judicial powers for investigation, arrest and punishment that the
village chiefs possess. The Report further describes a separate Constitutional
Tribunal and a court martial system.49 The Constitutional Tribunal is
responsible for interpreting and applying Myanmar’s Constitution.50 The
courts martial system is available for soldiers,51 operates independent of the
civilian judiciary, and is directly appealable to the Commander-in-Chief.52
The Report notes that Myanmar’s courts are formally independent from
other branches of government.53 Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution,54 and the
Union Judiciary law protect the principle of judicial independence.55
Moreover, Myanmar’s legal system empowers the judiciary to “check” other
branches by issuing writs—including orders for habeas corpus—and quo
warranto orders, which in principle represent checks on the executive.56
this paper.
47. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 56.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 21.
51. This paper will only discuss the judicial independence implications of the courts martial system
to a limited degree, since the military seems to influence the judiciary more significantly in other ways.
52. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 21–22.
53. Id. at 57.
54. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, art. 19
(prescribing as a judicial principle that the High Court of regions and states must “administer justice
independently according to law”).
55. Jud. Law, Chapter § 2(a) (“The administration of justice shall be based upon the following
principles: to administer justice independently according to law.”).
56. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 57 (noting that for instance quo warranto orders “require
state officials to prove that they are authorised [sic] to conduct a contested activity”); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 824 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “habeas corpus” as “[a] writ employed to bring a person
before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal . . . .”
and quo warranto as “[a] common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is
held or a franchise is claimed.”).
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As of August 8th, 2012, the Myanmar Supreme Court had received 133
applications for writs, but granted only seven.57 One group credited the low
success rate of writ applications to “the [Myanmar] Court’s ‘fear [and]
subservience.’”58 Although it is possible that the large disparity between the
writ applications submitted and those actually granted may stem from the
fact that many lacked merit, the disparity may suggest that the court is
hesitant to “check” its coordinate branches of government to the fullest of its
authority.59
Furthermore, the Constitution provides courts with the institutional
machinery to perform judicial review of legislative and executive actions.60
However, the Report also notes that the executive undermines many
protections of the judiciary’s independence through various constitutional
dynamics.61 For instance, although the President must seek approval from
the legislature for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Union and other
members of the Supreme Court,62 the legislature may only refuse a
nominated candidate if it can demonstrate they fail to meet certain
qualifications.63 This situation rarely arises, because one of the competency
qualifications under §301 is that the President considers the candidate to be
“an eminent jurist.”64 While the Report does not expressly say so, this
nomination process threatens judicial independence. Allowing the President
to select candidates based solely on the President’s personal esteem for the
jurist (who is not required be a judge) effectively allows a bypass of any
minimum qualification standards the judiciary may have developed. The
lack of transparency with regard to the President’s discretion in selecting
candidates creates the risk that jurists could be selected due to their political
allegiance rather than their judicial qualifications.65 The Report hints at this
57. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 59.
58. Id. at 59 n. 185.
59. Id. at 59 (“The IBAHRI delegates were unable to assess that view, not least because it presumes
on the merits of applications about which they have no information, but they would nevertheless invite
the Court to consider whether its current approach to [the constitutional provision governing the granting
of writs] might be unduly cautious.”).
60. Id. at 38.
61. Id. at 57.
62. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, art. 299;
REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 57.
63. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR , May 29, 2008, art. 299(c).
64. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, art. 301(d)(iv);
see also REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 57 (“[Q]ualifications are alternatives and one of them is
simply that the president considers his candidate to be ‘an eminent jurist’”.) (citation omitted).
65. See OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION, PROFESSIONAL TRAINING SERIES NO. 9: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: A MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS 123 (2003)
(“[I]rrespective of the method of selection of judges, candidates’ professional qualifications and their
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problem by noting that Thein Sein, himself a retired member of the
military,66 appointed a retired Lieutenant Colonel to be Supreme Court Chief
Justice in 2012.67
Likewise, the President, in coordination with the Chief Justice of the
Union, appoints the Chief Justices of the respective States or Regions who
then, in collaboration with the President and Union Chief Justice, appoint
justices for their regions and states.68 The regional legislatures—much like
the national legislature—may only refuse candidates for failure to meet
constitutional qualifications, which include being considered “an eminent
jurist” by the President.69 Finally, the President nominates three of the
Constitutional Tribunal’s nine members (the two houses of the legislature
also nominate three members each).70 The first Chair of the Constitutional
Tribunal was a retired major-general and only three of the nine members
were former judges.71 The Supreme Court appoints all other judges, but
according to the report, an ex-Chief Justice selects the High Court judges,
while a Public Service Selection and Training Board select the lower level
judges.72
According to the report, lower level judges are not protected from
dismissal.73 The Supreme Court and High Court judges enjoy tenure until
age seventy and sixty-five respectively, while the Constitutional Tribunal
judges have fixed terms of five years.74 Each of these groups of jurists can
voluntarily resign or risk impeachment.75 The President or representatives of
the national legislature can impeach judges of the Supreme Court, judges of
the regional and state High Courts, and Members of the Constitutional
Tribunal for various offenses including “misconduct”76 and “inefficient
personal integrity must constitute the sole criteria for selection. Consequently, judges cannot lawfully be
appointed or elected because of the political views they hold. . . .”).
66. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 22.
67. Id. at 57.
68. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, art. 308(b)(i)
(“The President, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union and the Chief Minister of the Region
or State concerned, shall prepare the nomination for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High
Court of the Region or State concerned and the Chief Minister of the Region or State concerned, in coordination with the Chief Justice of the Union, shall prepare the nomination for the appointment of the
Judges of the High Court of the Region or State concerned . . . .”).
69. Id. at arts. 308(b)(ii), 310.
70. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 57.
71. Id. at 38.
72. Id. at 57.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, arts. 302(a)(iii);
311(a)(iii) & (b); 334(a)(iii) & (b).
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discharge of duties assigned by law.”77 The Commission sought clarification
on the content of the “misconduct” offense,78 and learned from one source
that it meant “something that a judge ought not to do.”79
In arguably the most serious constitutional crisis the new civilian
government had faced to date, President Thein Sein asked the Constitutional
Tribunal in 2012 to rule that certain committees established by the legislature
did not qualify as union-level organizations—a status that would guarantee
them certain legislative and budgetary privileges.80 The Tribunal supported
the President’s position.81 In response, the Legislature moved to impeach all
nine members of the Tribunal for allegedly breaching the Constitution by
“fail[ing] to discharge their legal duties.”82 All nine members of the
Constitutional Tribunal resigned before the Legislature took final action.83
According to the Commission’s assessment, “[t]he impeachment threat was
formally permissible under the Constitution.”84
The executive also wields considerable power over the financing of the
nation’s courts. Although the Supreme Court assesses the courts’ annual
budget in advance, the executive is authorized to present the budget to the
Legislature, where it can be “discussed . . . but not refused or curtailed.”85
While the Commission does not explore this dynamic in detail, other sources
indicate that there may be sufficient ambiguity in the Constitution to allow
the executive to amend the judiciary’s budget proposal before it submits it to
the legislature for review.86 This in turn creates a risk of undue financial
pressure of the executive over members of the judiciary.
The Report notes an additional example of the extensive executive
power vis-à-vis the judiciary in that under the State Protection Act 1975, the
President’s Cabinet can allow detentions of an individual for as long as
“three years without trial or independent judicial review.87 This suggests that
77. Id. at arts. 302(a)(v); 311(a)(v); 334(a)(v).
78. The offense is not defined in the Constitution of Myanmar’s Judicial Law. See generally
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR , May 29, 2008 and Jud. Law.
79. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 58.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 57 (quoting CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR , May 29,
2008, arts. 297, 103(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. See Kyaw Min San, Critical Issues for the Rule of Law in Myanmar, in MYANMAR’S
TRANSITION: OPENINGS, OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 221 (Nick Cheesman et al. eds., 2012)
(“[B]ecause the Union Government can decide on the question of the judicial budget, it means that the
executive can potentially restrict the amount of money going to the judiciary.”).
87. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 37.
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due process—an issue that would otherwise be for the judiciary to decide—
can be subsumed into the executive’s powers at the executive’s discretion.
This undermines the judiciary’s ability to provide an independent check on
executive action. It may also create subliminal pressure on the judiciary to
decide cases in accordance with the executive’s expectations, based on the
fear that the executive will conduct more extra-judicial detainments, if the
judiciary does not provide the executive with the outcomes that the executive
wants.
In a similar dynamic of executive extrajudicial prerogatives, the
Commission notes that the President may declare a state of emergency after
coordination with the National Defense and Security Council.88 During such
an emergency situation, the President can promulgate an administrative
order transferring the powers of the judiciary to the Commander-in-Chief of
the Defense Services.89
Beyond the power that the Commander-in-Chief exercises in states of
emergency, the Report indicates that many people believe the army exhibits
significant control over the courts.90 This may result in part from historical
trends and dynamics. The Report shows that under martial law the judges
were not keepers and defenders of the law, but on the contrary ‘‘[j]udges
came to take a role as consultants. Martial law took no notice of law at all.”91
As of 2012, several constitutional and practical dynamics appeared to allow
the military to exercise significant influence over the entire country—
including the judiciary—while the judiciary was significantly limited in its
ability to provide an independent check on past and present military activity.
For instance, under the 2008 Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief is
responsible for appointing twenty-five percent of the members of the
country’s Union, state and regional legislatures.92 This provision also creates
a constitutional veto for constitutional amendments which must be passed by
more than seventy-five percent of the legislature.93 The Constitution also
88. Id.; see also CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR , May 29, 2008,
art. 410 (noting that this state of emergency is permitted in response to a report that “administrative
functions cannot be carried out in accord with the Constitution in a Region or a State . . . .”).
89. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR , 2008, art. 413(b); see also
REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 37 (“Chapter XI of the Constitution allows [the President] to
declare a regional or national state of emergency – in which case, the powers of all three branches of
government pass to the Commander-in-Chief of the army.”).
90. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 58 (noting that judges feared pressure from the military
and citing the perception by a journalist and many community activists that the judiciary “was inactive
and subordinate to the military.”).
91. See id. (internal citation omitted) (noting also that “[Myanmar’s courts] are short of persons
with sufficient knowledge, especially where legislation is concerned”).
92. Id. at 53.
93. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, art. 436(a);
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created blanket amnesty for members of previous military regimes—for any
act done in the “execution of their respective duties.94 Furthermore, while
some reports have indicated that soldiers have been persecuted for criminal
activity, reports have also noted that many cases involving criminal activity
by military personnel have been dismissed.95
One of the most significant constitutional provisions regarding judicial
independence and the military is Article 40(c), which allows the
Commander-in-Chief to declare a state of emergency and assume power
without consent by the executive, if an emergency situation arises “that could
cause . . . disintegration of national solidarity and loss of sovereign power.”96
While this provision is somewhat vague, the mere possibility of such a move
allows the military to exert a degree of intimidation over all branches of
civilian government.97
B. Public Perception of Judicial Independence in Myanmar at the Time of
the 2012 Report
The report’s concerns about threats to judicial independence are
mirrored in the Myanmar population’s perception of the judiciary. Some
individuals in the population believed that “the government could always
rely on support from the judiciary, which was inactive and subordinate to the
military.”98 Other groups claimed that “all judges feared complaints from
clients, reprimands from superior judicial officials, and pressure from the
government or military.”99 The Commission found the judiciary to be
“currently subject to inordinate influence by the executive and military[,] . .
. held in low esteem by the population at large, and widely considered to be
under-educated and corrupt.”100 Yet the Commission simultaneously
REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 53.
94. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, art. 445;
REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 53.
95. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 55 (“It is notable in this regard that at the time of the
delegation’s visit, members of the army were reportedly being prosecuted in a case arising out of an
interrogation in the Kachin village of Tawlawgyi in January 2012. Earlier in 2012, the Supreme Court
entertained (though then dismissed) a lawsuit from the husband of Sumlut Roi Ja, a Kachin woman
allegedly abducted and killed by soldiers in October 2011.”).
96. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, MAY 29, 2008, art. 40(c); see
also REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 53.
97. See LAWYERS’ COUNCIL, LIST OF THE MOST PROBLEMATIC PROVISIONS IN THE 2008
CONSTITUTION AND BURMESE LAWS 3 (June 2012), http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/
Unjust_and_unfair_laws_of_Burma-BLC-red.pdf [https://perma.cc/C695-8WTZ] (noting that the
emergency provisions in Section 40 of the Constitution of Myanmar are too vague in their definitions,
thereby giving the Commander in Chief too much discretion).
98. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 58.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 7.

EPLING - FOR PUBLICATON(DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

11/28/2016 9:07 AM

HOW FAR HAVE WE COME AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

121

received reports that “ordinary people were ignorant about their legal rights
and poorly equipped to enforce them.”101
In short, although the constitution formally protects judicial
independence, structural, historic and practical realities create grave
concerns with regards to the potential for undue influence upon the courts—
particularly from the executive and the military in Myanmar.
IV. THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of its findings, the Commission offered several
recommendations to improve and maintain intra-governmental judicial
independence. The Commission recommended country-wide improvements
to judicial independence, including “clearer terms [on] how judges are to be
appointed, promoted, paid, and (where justified) removed,”102 as well as the
creation of a Judicial Appointments Board103 and a Ministry of Justice that
would be responsible for administering the courts system.104 The Report also
emphasized that the five-year terms currently held by members of the
Constitutional Tribunal were too short to ensure judicial independence,
particularly since the terms expired contemporaneously with the President’s
term of office.105 The Report recommended staggering the appointments of
Constitutional Tribunal members and extending their terms to prevent them
from expiring contemporaneously with the President’s term. The Report
specifically recommended ten-year or staggered terms.106 Finally, the Report
recommended increased training of adjudicators in informal dispute
resolution mechanisms, including training for village chiefs on the content
of Myanmar’s Constitution.107 The Report further recommended considering
the interdependence of institutions alongside their independence to prevent
one branch from wielding its power without accountability.108 The
Commission also highlighted the need for “training programmes for judges,
paying particular attention to the UN’s Basic Principles, and the particular
importance of ethical training.”109

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 74.
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN MYANMAR’S JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
SINCE THE COMMISSION’S REPORT
Unfortunately, English language information and official reports about
the state of judicial independence in Myanmar’s courts since the
Commission’s 2012 Report remain sparse. Nevertheless, enough
information is available to determine a general correlation and pinpoint
disparities between the report’s recommendations and current practices at a
constitutional and institutional level, as well as current perceptions of
judicial independence by various members of the populace, the executive,
the legislature, and the judiciary.
A. Structural Changes Affecting Judicial Independence in Myanmar Since
the Report
Developments in judicial independence that require structural reform
either through legislation or constitutional amendment are easily identifiable
due to the availability of English versions of Myanmar’s Constitution and
English translations of several pieces of legislation.110 Since the
Commission’s 2012 report, there have been no constitutional amendments,
with a 2015 package of proposed constitutional amendments failing to attain
the seventy-five percent super-majority vote required for an amendment.111
Thus, the Commission’s recommendations involving constitutional
amendments—including appointment procedures for the highest members of
the judiciary, terms for members of the Constitutional Tribunal and certain
provisions regarding the structures surrounding payment and removal of
judges—are constrained by the limits established by the Constitution.
The absence of constitutional reform to mitigate these dynamics is
likely due to constitutional provisions which effectively allow the military
contingent to veto any constitutional amendment.112 According to the
Constitution, any changes to the constitutional amendment provision would

110. See, e.g., Myanmar Constitutional Tribunal website, http://www.myanmarconstitutional
tribunal.org.mm/en/content/2008-constitution-0 [https://perma.cc/T7T5-NJAP] (last visited Oct. 22,
2016) (providing an English version of Myanmar’s Constitution); Parliament Watch List of New Laws,
ALTSEAN-BURMA, http://www.altsean.org/Research/Parliament%20Watch/Laws.php
[https://perma.cc/LZH2-8JAL] (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (providing a list of approved and unapproved
laws, including a few English translations of the legislation, up through July of 2013).
111. Letter from Human Rights Watch to President U Htin Kyaw, (May 4, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/04/hrw-letter-president-u-htin-kyaw [https://perma.cc/BKU4-QLB
J].
112. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, art. 436(a)
(requiring more than seventy-five percent of the legislature to approve any constitutional amendment);
arts. 109(b) & 141(b) (prescribing that the Commander-in-Chief shall nominate one quarter of both
houses of the legislature from the Defense Services).
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itself require the consent of these military gatekeepers. As an illustration of
the power of this provision, five million individuals signed a petition in
support of reforming the constitution’s amendment provision and removing
the military’s veto power, but nothing changed.113 It is worth noting that
while the military has effectively blocked major constitutional reform, its
economic interests have continued to prosper.114 Finally, despite lawyers and
activists calling for the formation of a Ministry of Justice by the National
League of Democracy (“NLD”),115 the new government has thus far not done
so.116
In March 2016, the then-President-elect, Htin Kyaw, nominated nine
members to the Constitutional Tribunal, three of whom he had appointed.117
The proposed chairman, Myo Nyunt, a legislative appointee, was previously
a judge for a regional High Court.118 Two of the tribunal members were
members of the preceding tribunal and only one member was a member of
the executive’s party, the NLD.119 At the time of this paper,120 it remains
unclear what effect this new tribunal will have on constitutional
developments in Myanmar.
B. Public Perception of Judicial Independence in Myanmar Since the
Report
Beyond a lack of structural reform, evidence suggests, as a practical
matter, that various actors in the government and the populace consider
judicial independence to be an ongoing problem more than three years after
the recommendations. For example, research by the International Bar
Association since the 2012 Report identified trust in the judiciary as one of

113. See REBECCA LOWE, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, BEYOND YANGON (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=a317d5b8-f1e6-4977-8111-b0ff3d49ca15
[https://perma.cc/7NCQ-2MYN].
114. Shibani Mahtani, Myanmar Government Speeds Through Contracts, Legislation, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/myanmar-government-speeds-through-contracts-legislation
-1452458947 [https://perma.cc/E74S-T7Y5] (noting the military-linked regime’s transfer of several
factories to the military before leaving office, possibly indicating that “the military intends to continue to
exert influence over the country’s economic assets”).
115. Ye Mon, Lawyers, Activists Press for Justice Ministry, MYANMAR TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/19498-lawyers-activists-press-forjustice-ministry.html [https://perma.cc/S72C-RN76].
116. Id.
117. Ksmaw, Constitutional Tribunal Nominated, ELEVEN (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.elevenmy
anmar.com/politics/constitutional-tribunal-nominated [https://perma.cc/F6YQ-B6 DX] (last visited Oct.
22, 2016).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Early May 2016.
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the biggest problems facing Myanmar’s judiciary.121 There continue to be
reports from the populace indicating a lack of confidence in the judiciary’s
ability to promote justice, particularly against abuses committed by the
executive or the military.122
Furthermore, during the 2015 elections, the NLD—which would go on
to win the election123 and to select Myanmar’s new President124—
specifically identified judicial independence as one of their top party
priorities.125 The NLD’s election manifesto claimed that “[t]he judiciary
must stand independently and on an equal footing with the legislative and
executive branches. The judiciary must be free of the influence and control
of the executive branch.”126 The NLD’s emphasis on the importance of
judicial independence from the executive indicates that the content of the
Commission’s recommendations resonated with key players, but there
remains significant work to be done.
Furthermore, Myanmar’s legislature continues to signal concern over
the judiciary’s lack of independence. According to one source, an
investigation by a parliamentary committee reported that in addition to the
existence of a “chain of bribery” throughout the judicial system, there
continued to be inappropriate intra-governmental control.127 The source
indicated that under the constitutional system where the President appoints
the Chief Justice who then appoints all other judges, “a patronage network is
unofficially activated with each appointment and judges at every level are
under the influence of senior judges and the administration.”128 The source

121. LOWE, supra note 113.
122. See, e.g., New Call Issued for Justice for Murdered Myanmar Teachers, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jan 19, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3406579/New-call-issued-justice-murderedMyanmar-teachers.html [https://perma.cc/49W9-5CP2] (reporting that local villagers indicate that they
know that two teachers were raped and murdered by government soldiers, but that the villagers do not
have the power to investigate the crime and bring the perpetrators to justice).
123. See Jonah Fisher, Myanmar’s 2015 Landmark Elections Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33547036 [https://perma.cc/693M-NFXJ] (“Aung San Suu Kyi’s
National League for Democracy (NLD) has won a landslide victory in Myanmar after general elections
on 8 November.”).
124. Myanmar Elects Htin Kyaw as First Civilian President in Decades, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35808921 [https://perma.cc/QE2S-PJ2R].
125. National League for Democracy, 2015 Election Manifesto, art. 2(5), 3(b)(2) (2015),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-Tuf9DZaVm9ZmFLdm9wUjh1TzA/view [https://perma.cc/MM5ZNYEX].
126. Id.
127. Aung Din, Myanmar’s Old Judiciary a Challenge to the New Era of Governance, COGITASIA
BLOG (Jan. 5, 2016), http://cogitasia.com/myanmars-old-judiciary-a-challenge-to-the-new-era-of-gov
ernance/ [https://perma.cc/7YMZ-MUTP].
128. Id.
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further opined that the only way to combat these deep seated dynamics would
be to replace old judges with new ones.129
Interestingly, Myanmar’s Supreme Court’s 2015–2017 Judiciary
Strategic Plan identified judicial independence as one of its strategic action
areas, but focused on different aspects of independence.130 Rather than
focusing on increasing independence from coordinate branches of
government, the Judiciary Strategic Plan emphasized greater collaboration
with the other branches.131 The Plan focused on creating accountable and
transparent judicial budgets and increasing capabilities for the administration
of the courts, such as “IT Training” and a new “Public Information/IT”
department.132 While this financial focus appears consistent with the
Commission’s exhortations to clarify terms of judges’ remuneration,133 and
arguably incorporates the Commission’s recommendation to promote
institutional interdependence,134 it largely fails to address the judiciary’s
independence from the executive. This failure ultimately reinforces claims
that certain aspects of Myanmar’s judiciary are perpetuating traditional
norms of a judiciary subjugated to the executive.
One of the areas mentioned by the Commission that appears to have
undergone significant development is that of judicial training. The
Commission’s recommendations included increasing judicial training for
judges and quasi-judges at the village level and judicial training has been a
focus of international collaboration with Myanmar.135 Additionally,
Myanmar’s Supreme Court has prioritized the training of judges and court

129. Id. (“[T]he NLD government will not be able to implement these recommendations if it cannot
overhaul the current judiciary system by replacing old judges with the new ones.”).
130. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNION, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR,
ADVANCING JUSTICE TOGETHER: JUDICIARY STRATEGIC PLAN (2015–2017) 6 (2014).
131. Id. at 11 (noting the need for “the Judiciary [to] work[] closely with the executive and the
legislative branches to ensure justice for all.”).
132. Id.
133. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 7.
134. Id. at 39.
135. See THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNION, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, Chief
Justice of the Union Attends the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices’ Meeting which was Held at Boracay
Philippines (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.unionsupremecourt.gov.mm/?q=news/118 [https://perma.cc
/U6WF-Z94J] (“At the opening ceremony of the Meeting, Chief Justice of the Union delivered an opening
address like other Chief Justices and made his discussion at the consecutive meeting on the matters of . . .
cooperating in judicial education training with other countries.”); see also USAID, DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE: INCLUSIVE, ACCOUNTABLE, TRANSPARENT 2 (2016), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1861/2016%20USAID%20Burma_Democratic%20Governance_Fact%20Sheet.
pdf [https://perma.cc/N6CJ-K4H5] (noting that USAID has taught more than “600 judges and 200 state
law officers on due process, case analysis, judicial ethics, legal drafting, and public outreach.”).
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staff on communications, customer service,136 and media relations.137
Moreover, there is a specific strategic initiative in 2016 to “enhance training
for judges to achieve equality, fairness and integrity.”138 Specific steps for
achieving this goal included training for judges on “administration and
supervisory skills, case management, Code of Conduct, Legal English, Child
Right [sic],” as well as “scholarship programs for young judges.”139 There is
also an initiative to “[e]nhance capacity of the [Union Supreme Court]
Training Department and Judicial Training Center,” including “[a]nnual
study tours to Japan to observe how to implement effective trainings.”140
Whether these training initiatives will improve judicial independence in
Myanmar remains to be seen.
Finally, it is worth noting that although not strictly a component of an
independent judiciary, Myanmar has experienced significant progress in
organizing an independent bar association.141 The bar association has proven
a vehicle for engaging with the international legal community and may help
expose Myanmar’s legal and judicial community to international legal
norms.142 Furthermore, even though there will often be lawyers on opposing
sides of any given case, all lawyers have a vested interest in ensuring that
judges decide cases according to legal merit—where lawyers add value—
rather than according to political influence. For this reason, lawyers have
been strong advocates for judicial reform.143
In summary, the most significant progress vis-à-vis the Commission’s
recommendations has occurred in the realm of judicial training. Less
progress has been made in structural reform and in pursuing adjustments to
historic power dynamics that enable political actors to influence the courts.

136. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNION, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR,
ADVANCING JUSTICE TOGETHER: JUDICIARY STRATEGIC PLAN (2015–2017): YEAR 2 ACTION PLAN 5
(2016).
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Id. at 9.
140. Id. at 10.
141. Press Release, International Bar Association, IBA President and Aung San Suu Kyi Open
Inaugural Meeting of Myanmar’s First National Independent Lawyers’ Association (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=67923557-0f67-403c-ad67-ff04adc4ac52
[https://perma.cc/N9N4-UGQE].
142. See id. (noting that the International Bar Association was present at the first meeting of the
Myanmar Bar Association).
143. See Ye Mon, Lawyers, Activists Press for Justice Ministry, MYANMAR TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/19498-lawyers-activists-press-forjustice-ministry.html [https://perma.cc/FZ9Q-5KQF] (noting that lawyers were calling for judicial reform
including the creation of a ministry of justice).
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On a general level, significant issues regarding the independence of the
judiciary appear to persist.
VI. DIALECTIC ANALYSIS AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
ENGAGING LEGAL PROBLEMS IN MYANMAR
Analyzing the propriety of the Commission’s recommendations in light
of Myanmar’s current struggles with regards to intra-governmental judicial
independence is a difficult task. Which recommendations were correct, but
have not yet had time to come to fruition? It seems unrealistic to expect
Myanmar’s complete transformation from an authoritarian military
dictatorship to a country marked by complete judicial independence in a span
of three years. The Commission acknowledged as much.144 However, is it
possible after three years to determine which recommendations will never
lead to the desired results because they seek to transplant Western legal
dynamics and concepts into an inhospitable target culture?145
On the other hand, is it possible that the recommendations will never
lead to the desired levels of judicial independence because they sacrificed
sound internationally recognized judicial practices from the Basic Principles
in deference to Myanmar’s historic judicial dynamics?
In short, is achieving judicial independence in Myanmar simply a
matter of patience, or should the recommendations change to introduce more
internationally recognized practices at the risk of being ethnocentric, or be
more accommodating of the judicial practices already at work in Myanmar,
risking the problems of cultural relativism?
In an article discussing the pitfalls of ethnocentrism and cultural
relativism,146 Judith Schacherreiter explains that when institutions or
scholars attempt to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses and appropriate
courses of action for any foreign legal system there is an ever-present danger
144. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 15–24, 59 (noting that when it considered Myanmar’s
history, it concluded that “it would be unrealistic to expect overnight transformations [in regards to
judicial independence].”).
145. See John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East
Asia¸ 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L & POL. 657, 706 (2008) (explaining that complicated internal management
provisions in the draft business law were poorly suited for the norms that regulated most of the
Vietnamese entrepreneurs who were used to family-based management hierarchies).
146. Judith Schacherreiter, Das Verhängnis von Ethnozentrismus und Kulturrelativismus in der
Rechtsvergleichung: Ursachen, Ausprägungsformen und Strategien zur Überwindung (The Fate of
Ethnocentrism and Cultural Relativism in Comparative Law – Causes, Manifestations and Effective
Strategies), 77 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 272,
273 (2013), http://www.academia.edu/10453099/The_Fate_of_Ethnocentrism_and_Cultural_Relativism
_in_Comparative_Law_Causes_Manifestations_and_Effective_Strategies
[https://perma.cc/6KJAWDCG] ) [or, can link to untranslated version at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/
mohr/rabelsz/2013/00000077/00000002/art00004?crawler=true].
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that evaluators will be misguided by the heuristic pitfalls of ethnocentrism
and cultural relativism.147 Ethnocentrism uses evaluators’ domestic criteria
and values as universal standards.148 At the same time, there is a danger that
evaluators will categorically over-adjust in the opposite direction, namely
towards cultural relativism.149 Cultural relativism relies exclusively on the
foreign culture’s criteria and values as standards for evaluation, and
precludes any evaluation that originates in a different culture.150 Both
approaches fail to foster a constructive dialogue between different legal
cultures.151
According to Schacherreiter, ethnocentrism attempts to transform
foreign legal structures into systems that the evaluator is accustomed to,
while cultural relativism eschews constructive engagement with different
cultural worldviews and labels them inherently foreign.152 Creating a
conceptual dichotomy between the familiar and the foreign fails to appreciate
the existence of numerous similarities between cultures.153 In fact, there
exists a wide spectrum of perspectives between ethnocentrism and cultural
relativism. Along this spectrum are analytical perspectives that, by
employing a dialectic approach capitalizing on the tension between the
extremes of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism, can create a conceptual
space for understanding the various roots, influences, and internal
differences that differentiate the two systems.154

147. See Schacherreiter, supra note 146, at 273 (describing the dangers of “Ethnozentrismus” and
“Kulturrelativismus”).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 275 (explaining that critiques of “Ethnozentrismus” often fall into
“Kulturrelativismus” instead).
150. Id. at 273.
151. See id. at 276 (“Letztlich sind beide Zugänge, ethnozentristischer Universalismus und radikaler
(Kultur-) Relativismus, unbefriedigend, weil sie beide polarisieren, anstatt differenzierte
rechtsvergleichende Auseinandersetzung, Kommunikation und Kritik zu fördern.”) (Translation:
“Finally, both approaches, ethnocentric universalism and radical (cultural) relativism, are unsatisfactory,
because they polarize instead of encouraging differentiated comparative legal engagement,
communication and critique.”).
152. See id. at 280 (“Diese Zuordnungen europäisieren einerseits, exotisieren andererseits, und
stärken damit jene Zugänge, die entweder versuchen, das Fremde zu assimilieren (Ethnozentrismus) oder
aber es als grundlegend Anderes ganz sich selbst zu überlassen (Kulturrelativismus).”) (Translation:
“These assignments make things more European on the one hand and more exotic on the other; and they
encourage approaches that attempt to either assimilate the foreign (Ethnocentrism) or leave it entirely to
itself as inherently “other” (cultural relativism).”).
153. Id. at 285.
154. Id. at 299 (“If we reconceptualise the relationship between the Self and the Other as a dialectic
relationship between heterogeneous and hybrid entities, we can generate comparative law approaches that
go beyond ethnocentrism and cultural relativism.”).
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VII. A DIALECTIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION’S REPORT
Applying this dialectic approach to the Commission’s Report requires
determining the degree to which the recommendations represent
ethnocentric ideals foreign to Myanmar’s cultural framework, and the degree
to which the ideals resonate with existent cultural dynamics in Myanmar.
One step in this direction is to analyze regional statements on judicial
independence endorsed by Myanmar. In 1995, a group of Asian and Pacific
countries collectively developed regionally specific “minimum standards to
be observed in order to maintain the independence and effective functioning
of the judiciary” (the “Beijing Principles”).155 Chief Justices from countries
as diverse as Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of
China, Singapore and Indonesia agreed upon these basic principles of
judicial independence.156 The Honorable U Aung Toe, Myanmar’s Chief
Justice at the time, signed the agreement on behalf of Myanmar.157
Rather than marking a departure from international norms of judicial
independence, the Beijing Principles shared many similarities with the UN
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. For instance, as to the
relationship between the judiciary and the executive, the Beijing Principles
state that the “[e]xecutive powers which may affect judges in their office,
their remuneration or conditions or their resources, must not be used so as to
threaten or bring pressure upon a particular judge or judges.”158 This
explanation of judicial independence compares favorably with the UN Basic
Principles, which state that “[t]he judiciary shall decide matters before them
impartially . . . without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for
any reason,”159 and that “[t]here shall not be any inappropriate or
unwarranted interference with the judicial process.”160
This overlap between judicial independence as articulated by the
international community and the principles endorsed by Myanmar may
suggest that judicial independence as articulated by the UN Basic Principles
represents a universal value, thereby reducing fears that the Commission’s
155. See Hon. David K. Malcolm, Independence and Accountability: An Asian Pacific Perspective,
in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND
EQUITABLE SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 219, 221 (Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck ed. 2001), (referencing
the adoption of the Beijing Statement of Principles of Independence of the Judiciary).
156. See generally LAWASIA: THE LAW ASSOCIATION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, BEIJING
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE LAWASIA REGION (1995)
[hereinafter “Beijing Principles”] (undersigned by the Chief Justices of the cited nations).
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id. at 7.
159. Basic Principles, art. 2.
160. Basic Principles, art. 4.
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reliance on those principles could lead to ethnocentrism.161 However, closer
examination reveals several practical realities that call for in-depth
engagement with this theory.
For instance, various shortfalls and threats to judicial independence in
Myanmar, particularly with respect to undue influence by the executive and
the military, stand in contrast to this ideal. Further, at the time Myanmar’s
Chief Justice ascribed to the Beijing Principles, collusion between the
judiciary and the executive was quite pronounced.162 One explanation for the
disparity between the ideals enshrined in the Beijing Principles and the
practical state of judicial independence in Myanmar may be that many of
the ideals are in fact abstract, hortatory or tautological.163 Another
explanation for the variance between the professed ideals and the practical
realities of judicial independence is that any country will likely fall short of
such international ideals.164 Yet, there may be more to the disparity than an
inescapable gulf between ideal and reality.
A tension between a general allegiance to democratic principles and the
acceptance of authoritarian dynamics appeared in a recent regional survey.165
Myanmar demonstrated the highest support for democracy of any country in
the region166—a dynamic commonly associated with the expansion of
judicial power.167 However, Myanmar’s support for democracy is
accompanied by an exceptionally low appreciation for liberal democratic
values, such as “political freedom, pluralism, . . . and accountability” even
when compared with other countries in the region.168 Some scholars refer to

161. See REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 88 (providing the UN Basic Principles in an annex
to its report).
162. See CHEESMAN, supra note 38, at 140–41 (noting that in 1991 Union Chief Justice Aung Toe
effectively relinquished the courts role of providing even a procedural check against confessions obtained
by torture in submission to military intelligence).
163. See Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 4 (“[T]ake Article 3 of the Beijing Principles: ‘The judiciary
has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all issues of a justiciable nature.’ So far so good, but
are decisions regarding states of emergency and declarations of war justiciable in nature?”).
164. See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTE (IBAHRI) THEMATIC PAPERS NO 4: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 6–8 (June 2014) (noting
several incidences that drew the judicial independence of several courts in the United States and Australia
into question).
165. See Bridget Welsh et al., Burma Votes for Change: Clashing Attitudes toward Democracy, 27
J. OF DEMOCRACY 132, 133 (2016) (noting Myanmar’s participation in the Asian Barometer Survey).
166. Id.
167. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 71, 73 (2004) (“Most scholars of constitutional politics agree that there is a strong correlation
between the recent worldwide expansion of the ethos and practice of democracy and the contemporaneous
global expansion of judicial power.”).
168. Welsh et al., supra note 168, at 133–34 (noting that only Vietnam had more illiberal views of
democracy).
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illiberal governmental arrangements as statist.169 Under statist concepts,
governments represent corporatist entities that attempt to cooperatively
regulative and manage civil society.170 There, the power of the executive and
the judiciary are designed to work in concert and collaboratively, rather than
in opposition to counterbalance one another.171 Multiple countries in Asia,
including Singapore and China, exhibit “soft-authoritarian,”172 or “statist”
governmental systems.173 While Singapore’s common law tradition exposed
it to the notion of separation of powers and judicial independence, it
perpetuates a type of authoritarian arrangement.174
This type of government does not preclude the development of intragovernmental judicial independence altogether. For instance, Singapore has
demonstrated an ability to limit government action in routine matters.175
However, the courts refrain from using their judicial powers against the
ruling party.176
Judicial independence in these types of authoritarian regimes often
proves most influential in the economic sector.177 If a government desires to
incentivize foreign entrepreneurs to invest within its borders, the creation of
an independent judiciary to guard against unlawful government
expropriations in economic matters increases foreign actors’ willingness to
invest.178 Judges in other Asian countries, including Korea and Taiwan,
maintained relative autonomy over economic matters, but surrendered a
degree of judicial independence in politically sensitive matters.179
Ran Hirschl’s hegemonic preservation thesis may explain the
asymmetric development of judicial independence—establishing
169. Kanishka Jayasuriya, Corporatism and Judicial Independence within Statist Legal Institutions
in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
173, 173 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
170. Id.
171. Id. (noting “significant concertation or collaboration between the judiciary and the executive”
in statist judicial independence models).
172. Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion,
in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE
ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE US 1, 16 (Randall Peerenboom ed. 2004).
173. Jayasuriya, supra note 169, at 173.
174. See Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Independence in East Asia: Implications for China 5 (U. of
Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 295, 2010), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1172&context=public_law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/CKE8-NP
JD] (“Singapore’s judiciary has the advantage of having come from the common law tradition, in which
independence is a more longstanding ideological and institutional goal.”).
175. Id. at 4–5.
176. Id. at 5.
177. See id. at 11.
178. See id. at 4.
179. Id. at 11–12.
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preeminence in the economic sphere, while submitting itself to the executive
in highly politicized matters.180 Under Hirschl’s theory, judicial
empowerment occurs in response to the dynamics between three groups:
[1] threatened political elites who seek to preserve or enhance their
political hegemony by insulating policy-making processes from the
vicissitudes of democratic politics . . . [2] economic elites who may view
the constitutionalization of certain economic liberties as a means of
promoting a neoliberal agenda of open markets, [and 3] judicial elites and
national high courts that seek to enhance their political influence and
international reputation.181

Under this framework, economic power players often have more to gain
through the economic growth associated with increased international
investment, even if the price of such investment requires surrendering
control over economic matters to the judiciary. Moreover, under Hirschl’s
model the political elite retain their power because their countries will likely
benefit from economic growth and economic matters do not affect their core
political functions. On the other hand, economic elites do not necessarily
benefit from the involvement of an influential judiciary in politically
sensitive matters that do not affect them. In contrast, political elites have
strong incentives to oppose the judiciary’s encroachment into such
politically sensitive areas. According to Hirschl’s theory, power players in
the judiciary are willing to agree to a model of limited judicial independence
to the extent it will increase their own international reputation and their own
power within the government.182
Many elements of these theories, as well as certain facets of other Asian
authoritarian regimes, resonate with Myanmar’s history and present
conditions.183 Myanmar has exhibited esteem for the rule of law, but has also
allowed authoritarian government practices. For instance, prior to 1998,
Burmese regimes carried out human rights violations while claiming to be
supporting and even furthering the “rule of law.”184 Myanmar’s historically
strong and influential executive has likely shaped the nation’s perception of
an appropriate balance between political branches. Like Singapore,
180. Hirschl, supra note 167, at 90 (“[P]olitical elites in association with economic and judicial elites
who have compatible interests determine the timing, extent, and nature of constitutional reforms.”).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. While the Commission does provide an overview of Myanmar’s history in its report, REPORT
OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 16–24, it does not provide an in-depth analysis of historical analysis of
factors that could affect current intra-governmental dynamics with respect to judicial independence.
184. See CHEESMAN, supra note 38, at 4–5 (noting that one Burmese government cited the rule of
law to support the imposition of a military administration on the city. Later the government explained the
violence associated with the violent expulsion of tens of thousands of alleged foreigner as upholding the
law).
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Myanmar has a common law background, in which the country was exposed
to the concept of judicial independence.185 Yet even during portions of the
British colonial period, which later Burmese authorities claimed instilled
rule of law principles in Burma,186 the colonial district court was not
comprised of members of a judiciary, but instead of civil servants, while a
member of the executive, the Commissioner, oversaw the court of final
appeal.187 Even once autonomous judiciaries began operating in colonial
Burma, judges were required to answer to the governor, further entrenching
the executive’s control over the judiciary.188 Some scholars even contend that
the use of a Penal Code in Burma by the British—who as a common law
country did not have a domestic Penal code189—was in fact a means of
“strengthen[ing] the hand of the sovereign power over the judiciary.”190 After
all, the British colonization was driven primarily by economic, not political,
purposes and the legal structure was likely crafted to support that goal.191
Moreover, any semblance of judicial independence present in Burma
after it achieved independence in 1947192 was entirely overshadowed by the
absolute subjugation of the judiciary to the executive under the
Revolutionary period starting in 1962 with Ne Win’s military coup.193 After
overthrowing the democratically elected government, the revolutionary
council abolished the country’s high courts due to the threat they posed to

185. See Zan, supra note 2, at 11.
186. Id. at 7.
187. See CHEESMAN, supra note 38, at 46.
188. See id. at 47.
189. Comparative Criminal Law and Enforcement: England and Wales - Law Enforcement: The
Police And Prosecution, Prosecutors: Crown Prosecution Service, Criminal Courts: Pre-trial And Trial,
JRANK, http://law.jrank.org/pages/660/Comparative-Criminal-Law-Enforcement-England-Wales.html#
ixzz455k0etyr [https://perma.cc/C57U-XKNG] (“In the United Kingdom there is no penal code. The
sources and interpretation of the criminal laws are to be found in individual Acts of Parliament (statutory
sources) and decisions by judicial bodies, in particular the Court of Appeal (case law).”).
190. See CHEESMAN, supra note 38, at 40, 42 (noting the imposition of the Indian Penal Code over
Myanmar within the context of codification being used to enforce the supremacy of the ruler).
191. See id. at 38 (“The British colonisers used law to dominate colonized people and extract
resources from their lands.”); David I. Steinberg, Maung Htin Aung & Michael Arthur Aung-Thwin,
Myanmar: History – The Colonial Economy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 7, 2016)
http://www.britannica.com/place/Myanmar/The-initial-impact-of-colonialism [https://perma.cc/C57UXKNG] (“[Under the British,] Burma’s economy became part of the vast export-oriented enterprise of
western colonialism.”).
192. See Zan, supra note 2, at 14–15 (citing Ma Thaung Kyi v. The Deputy Commissioner,
Hanthawaddy and One, 1949 BLR 30 (S.C.) where a lack of due process in detention orders was stopped
and Ah Kam v. U Shwe Phone & Others, 1952 BLR (SC) where the court determined that the President
had acted beyond his scope of authority).
193. David I. Steinberg, Michael Arthur Aung-Thwin, & Maung Htin Aung, Myanmar: History –
The Socialist State, 1962-88, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 7, 2016) http://www.britannica.
com/place/Myanmar/Myanmar-since-1988 [https://perma.cc/NKR4-J43N].
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the ruling power.194 The law was not meant to be a check on power, but rather
an instrument to promote policy.195 During this period, principles of judicial
independence were further subverted by the appointment of executive and
legislative officers and non-legally trained Party members to various levels
of the judiciary and tribunals.196 This lack of judicial independence became
formalized in the 1974 Constitution, which unified in the executive,
legislative and judiciary branches, subjecting them all to the Party’s control,
and requiring their support of the Party’s objectives.197
Even in 1988, when the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(“SLORC”) came to power and abolished the organs of state power created
by the 1974 Constitution,198 judges remained subservient to the will of the
controlling power and were themselves unprotected by safe-guards such as
tenure.199 In fact, there are reports that judges were dismissed for failing to
follow the executive’s orders to give rulings that would have violated the
laws.200 Moreover, under the SLORC’s legal framework the Supreme Court
was directly under the SLORC’s authority,201 and the President could ask the
Chief Justice to resign even without legislative approval.202 Judges during
this period were accustomed to functioning merely as administrators of state
policy, instead of judges applying the law.203
Although Burmese and Myanmar governments were never communist
systems per se,204 there are significant similarities between communism’s
authoritarian control of the judiciary and the practices in the nation at various
points during the nation’s era of military rule. Much like the authoritarian
dynamics in Burma and Myanmar, Marxist legal theory did not support the
concept of judicial independence, and considered the law as a means to
“maintain the existing political system and quash unrest.”205 Under the
194. Zan, supra note 2, at 17.
195. CHEESMAN, supra note 38, at 82 (noting that law was an instrument to affect policy, not an
authority on its own right).
196. See Zan, supra note 2, at 19–20 (noting that members of the executive and the legislature
constituted members of special courts and many Party members without legal qualifications were made
judges).
197. Id. at 21–22.
198. Id. at 27.
199. Id. at 28.
200. Id. at 29.
201. CHEESMAN, supra note 38, at 98.
202. Zan, supra note 2, at 31.
203. REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 56.
204. DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA: THE STATE OF MYANMAR xxxii (2001) (noting that although
Burma had a “highly centralized single-party dictatorship,” a socialist system and Marxist ideals, it also
has a relatively open economy and opposed the Burmese Communist Party).
205. Erik S. Herron & Kirk A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial
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socialist paradigm, the state was thought to be the embodiment of the
people’s will and as such did not require an independent judiciary to keep it
in check.206
In Burmese and Myanmar governments, the executive assumed
responsibility for maintaining societal order. To explain the prevalence of
these authoritarian ideals in Myanmar, Nick Cheesman contends that in
Myanmar the ideal of “law and order,” though often conflated with “rule of
law,”207 is a separate and antithetical ideal in which “the state’s forces bind
people’s general activity, to ensure they remain decent and inoffensive, quiet
and unassuming.”208 Cheesman’s law and order political philosophy has
significant implications for the independence of the judiciary because it
endorses unequal political relations on grounds that a superior moral
authority (the executive) must be free to assert its influence on the unruly.209
In this political order, the judiciary is not intended to check the executive,
but rather to support the executive’s pursuit of order.210
Perhaps this societal value of order explains why Myanmar citizens
who allegedly distrust their government211 and oppose authoritarian
regimes,212 still support highly authoritarian ideals with regards to other
social and political dynamics.213 One scholar claims that this contrast
between opposition to authoritarian government and support for
authoritarian values is due in part to a lack of understanding in Myanmar
culture about democracy’s function.214 Under this theory, the rise of a certain
degree of judicial independence may be attributed citizens who oppose
authoritarian regimes, but shortfalls may flow from the populace’s lack of
understanding of the various dynamics that could lead to well-developed
judicial independence.
Furthermore, Hirschl’s theory may also account for the rise of judicial
independence in Myanmar despite the fact that the country’s present
Review in Post-Communist Courts 65 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 422, 427 (2003).
206. See id. (“According to socialist theories, the state was the embodiment of the people and a
formal division of powers was unnecessary.”).
207. CHEESMAN, supra note 38, at 9.
208. Id. at 30.
209. See id. at 31.
210. Id. at 169 (emphasizing judges’ role in perpetuating the semblance of orderliness).
211. Welsh et al., supra note 165, at 136 (noting that Myanmar citizens generally have “negative
views of the government and of governance”).
212. Id. at 136 (“[A] mere [four] percent of respondents in Burma said that ‘under some
circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one,’ whereas [thirty-one]
percent of Thai respondents agreed with this statement.”).
213. Id. at 134 (“[T]he vast majority of citizens [in Burma] still subscribe to authoritarian values and
beliefs.”).
214. Id.
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constitutional structure has impaired significant aspects of judicial
independence. More specifically, the theory could offer an explanation for
the incentive dynamics between political reform and economic development
in Myanmar.215 For instance, one official stated that he believed increased
legal certainty was important for attracting international sources of capital—
a crucial driving force behind Myanmar’s economic development.216
Further, evidence suggests that the Myanmar military’s surrender of power
to a civilian government promoted their own economic interests by
facilitating access to open markets.217 Likewise, President Thein Sein’s
liberal efforts at reform in 2012 promoted judicial independence, and were
part of a wave of liberalization throughout the country that led the United
States and the European Union to drop most of their sanctions against
Myanmar.218 In combination with increased foreign investment and foreign
tourism, the removal of these sanctions led to significant economic growth
in the country.219
Under Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation thesis,”220 Myanmar’s
executive branch, which started as a military regime, was able to preserve a
significant policy making role for both the new civilian executive and the
military by establishing a Constitution that ensured both groups had
significant influence over other governmental actors. The military was
further empowered to block any attempts to remove this control through
constitutional amendments. In Myanmar, there is significant overlap
between the government or military elite and the economic elite.221 As such,
the interests of two of three elites in Hirschl’s framework (the political elites
and the economic elites) were significantly aligned, suggesting that
215. See generally DAVID HOOK, TIN MAUNG THAN & KIM N.B. NINH, THE ASIA FOUNDATION,
CONCEPTUALIZING PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM IN MYANMAR (June 2015).
216. See REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 34.
217. See Igor Blazevic, The Challenges Ahead, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 101, 103 (Apr. 2016) (“[Thein
Sein] was a disciplined executor of the former junta’s strategic master plan, who was fully aware that his
real mandate was to protect the interests of the military, Burman nationalism, and the country’s
oligarchs.”).
218. See Steinberg, Aung-Thwin, & Aung, supra note 193. Report of IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 22
(noting that in his inauguration speech President Thein said “We guarantee that all citizens will enjoy
equal rights in terms of law, and we will reinforce the judicial pillar.”).
219. See Steinberg, Aung-Thwin, & Aung, supra note 193.
220. See Hirschl, supra note 167, at 90 (examining the interaction of incentives among the executive,
economic and judicial elites).
221. See Mahtani, supra note 114 (noting that Myanmar’s military was able to transfer large
economic entities to its own control before it lost control of the government in 2016); Shibani Mahtani &
Richard C. Paddock, ‘Cronies’ of Former Myanmar Regime Thrive Despite U.S. Blacklist, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 12, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/cronies-of-former-myanmar-regime-thrive-despite-u-sblacklist-1439433052 [https://perma.cc/8CXX-G3VR] (noting that “top cron[ies]” of Myanmar’s former
military regime continue to wield significant control over the nation’s economy).
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surrendering a certain degree of political oversight to the judiciary was a
small price to pay for economic growth that would likely benefit wellconnected government and military elites. Finally, the historic political
weakness of Myanmar’s judiciary meant that it was not positioned to
negotiate its own rights and therefore had to simply accept the powers the
executive was willing to give.
The theory that authoritarian societal values led to limited judicial
independence does not stand in conflict with Hirschl’s hegemonic
preservation explanation for the lack of comprehensive judicial
independence. Moreover, neither theory suggests that judicial independence
is culturally inappropriate for Myanmar. Despite a historically strong
executive, the only situation in which judicial independence is inappropriate
for Myanmar is if the democratically elected executive—acting in
accordance with its own policy agenda—more accurately reflects
Myanmar’s collective societal will than an independent judiciary applying
the law. Although there are indications that Myanmar’s citizenry perceives
the judiciary as ineffective and corrupt, it is unlikely that the populace would
abandon the judiciary entirely and defer adjudicative control to the
executive. To find otherwise would over emphasize and exaggerate certain
aspects of Myanmar’s historical political dynamics. There are no serious
reports of any political actors in Myanmar calling for a dependent or
subordinate judiciary. Moreover, actors throughout Myanmar have indicated
a need for the judiciary to hold other branches accountable,222 and they have
protested its absence.223 As such, arguments that judicial independence is
inappropriate in Myanmar largely succumb to the pitfalls of cultural
relativism. Rather, there is potential in Myanmar to support judicial
independence, while at the same time acknowledging that any pursuit of
judicial independence must acknowledge and respect Myanmar’s current
conceptual frameworks and dynamics.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many of the Commission’s recommendations, especially those
concerning increased training, increased compensation and the possibility of
tenure for lower level judges, can likely be achieved under the current

222. See REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 7 (“A senior official who told the IBAHRI delegation
that ‘the new government needs not only to sue, but also to be sued.”).
223. See Thein Than Oo, Myanmar’s Lawyers’ Network, The Legacy of Dictatorship in Myanmar’s
Judicial System, ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (2015), http://www.humanrights.asia/
resources/journals-magazines/article2/1402/06 [https://perma.cc/QS66-SZF8] (noting how both Aung
San Su Kyi and the speaker of the legislature Shwe Man call for judicial independence in the country, but
lamenting how the 2008 Constitution effectively prevents judicial independence).
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Constitution. However, some of the Commission’s most significant
recommendations will likely require constitutional amendment. Under the
current political climate, there is a chance that premature or improper
pursuits of constitutional amendment could unravel the remarkable progress
that Myanmar’s judicial independence has experienced in recent years.
While structural and even constitutional reform is essential to securing
judicial independence, intermediary developments are likely necessary
before such reform can take place.
Evidence suggests that any attempt to amend the Constitution without
the military’s consent could lead to another coup.224 In such a situation, the
Myanmar judiciary lacks sufficient prestige or legitimacy to counter
unconstitutional encroachments by the military.225 Therefore, efforts to
promote judicial independence cannot rest on the pursuit of constitutional
amendments susceptible to military opposition. The Commission considered
the impeachment in 2012 of nine members of the Constitutional tribunal as
evidence of how fragile and volatile the current constitutional system can
be.226 Whereas the legislature is authorized to impeach judges for a variety
of reasons, the military has been empowered to commandeer the judiciary
during states of emergency. Both of these powers over the judiciary are illdefined and wielded with broad discretion.
Any reform efforts must therefore focus initially on interpersonal and
institutional allegiances that undercut the independence of the judiciary. One
immediate focus in this regard could be acknowledging and actively
combatting the network of control that results from the placement of exmilitary personnel into the judiciary.227 A recent initiative among Myanmar
lawyers to end the appointment of former military officers to the judiciary
provides an example of a method to curb the military’s informal influence
over the judiciary.228
224. Min Zin, The New Configuration of Power, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 116, 126 (Apr. 2016) (indicating
that the military might respond possibly with a “state of emergency” or legal coup if political actors
attempt to circumvent the current structures established in the Constitution).
225. See Erik S. Herron & Kirk A Randazzo, The Relationship between Independence and Judicial
Review in Post-Communist Courts, 65 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 422, 424 (2003) ( finding that “[j]udges
in post-communist courts may employ [judicial review strategies that seek to oppose unconstitutional
legislation through more non-confrontational methods such as finding only a portion of the statute to be
unconstitutional or striking down the legislation for procedural reasons] because they do not have the
prestige and legitimacy associated with judges in established democracies.”).
226. See REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 38.
227. Zin, supra note 224, at 113 (“A major task for the new government will be to ‘reoccupy’ the
institutions of the state by bringing more genuine civilians—not ex-military pseudocivilians—into as
many state agencies as possible.”).
228. Bhone Myat & Khet Mar, Myanmar Lawyers Launch Campaign to End Military Appointments
to the Judiciary, RADIO FREE ASIA (Khet Mar trans., Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.rfa.org/english/
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While the correlation between judicial independence and economic
investment may continue to improve Myanmar’s judicial independence, this
dynamic cannot be the only driver of change. The Commission’s
recommendations failed to appreciate that the group that will benefit the
greatest from an increase of judicial independence is the people of Myanmar
itself. The citizens of Myanmar likely have greater incentives to pursue an
independent judiciary than the judiciary itself. There is no evidence that
individual judges in Myanmar will necessarily be better off in a system
where they prioritize the dictates of the law over government priorities, but
the citizens of Myanmar certainly will be. While the judiciary may have to
weigh the tradeoffs between a cordial relationship with the executive and
international esteem, the citizens of Myanmar would gain protection from
overreaches by the executive.
Yet, while the citizens of Myanmar may have the greatest incentives
and possibly even hold the collective power to bring about change, there are
strong indications that based on their historic experiences with an oppressive
executive and subservient judiciary, they do not have a clear concept of what
judicial independence really is and how political demands of the populace
can increase it.229
While the Commission recommended improvements and training that
may benefit citizens at the village-chief level, some of the most important
reforms should be to teach citizens about their rights before all courts of the
country. The citizens of Myanmar how shown their willingness to protest
perceived injustice even at times when doing so was a great risk to
themselves.230 Judicial independence must become a grass-roots reality that
a critical mass of citizens and political actors coalesce around.231 While the
Commission did recommend educating the populace on its rights,232 this
must become a central rather than an ancillary focus of reform.
Finally, reformers must adopt a long-term strategy.233 The problems at
the heart of the lack of judicial independence in Myanmar are based in large
news/myanmar/lawyers-launch-campaign-to-end-military-appointments-to-the-judiciary09112015153320.html [https://perma.cc/VVP9-V3KU].
229. See Welsh, supra note 165, at 138 (noting a general lack of political knowledge among
Myanmar’s citizens).
230. See The Saffron Revolution, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.economist.com/
node/9867036 [https://perma.cc/6A2J-QNWF] (noting hundreds of thousands of Buddhist monks who
engaged in protests demanding democracy during the Saffron Revolution, despite the brutal response to
the popular revolt in 1988, which killed 3000 people).
231. See Igor Blazevic, The Challenges Ahead, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 101, 113–114 (stating that
engagement of various stakeholders including ex-military political players and ethnic-minority
stakeholders will be key in achieving genuine democratic reform).
232. See REPORT OF IBAHRI, supra note 11, at 6–8.
233. See Blazevic, supra note 231, at 113 (“[F]riends of Burma would be well-advised to keep their
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part on dynamics that have been going on for generations. Institutions alone
will not fix these problems.234 Only a sustained effort that acknowledges the
cultural framework in which these reforms must take place will allow lasting
transformation to take place.

expectations modest and to support its transition with patient long-term commitment.”).
234. Herron & Randazzo, supra note 205, at 435 (noting that in post-communist states
“[c]onstitutional engineers generally codified an independent judiciary, but court behavior often responds
to factors unrelated to its constitutionally defined authority.”).

